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MEANING'S EDGE, LOVE'S PRIORITY 
Patrick McKinley Brennan* 
THE EDGE OF MEANING. By James Boyd White. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press. 2001. Pp. xiv, 301. Cloth, $25; paper, 
$17. 
The god did not exist; but all the cosmic and psychic forces, the attrac­
tions, the passions which took shape in him, the idea which the artist and 
his contemporaries conceived of him - all that was present in the statue, 
not in a physical sense but in alio esse, in another mode of existence, and 
after the manner of the presence of knowability. For the statue had been 
made precisely to make all that known, to communicate it. In our muse­
ums, this pagan content is asleep, but it is always there. Let some acci­
dent take place, an encounter with a soul itself sensitized by some uncon­
scious content: contact is established; the pagan content will be 
awakened and will unforgettably wound that soul. 
- Jacques Maritain' 
I. CONSTITUTION AND FAITH 
The story is told of an American wending his way through the 
British Museum. Reaching the R0osetta Stone, he reached right over 
the railing, touched the scarred slab, and lamented: "It doesn't feel 
meaningful." Whereupon an old Briton was heard to mumble: "The 
poor American's got this old thing confused with the Blarney Stone." 
A bully presses his case, but meaning is much more modest. 
Powerless to insist upon itself, meaning lies in wait of discovery. What 
distinguishes the Rosetta Stone from other rocks of the same kind and 
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, The College of Law at Arizona State University. 
B.A. 1988, Yale; J.D. 1993, University of California at Berkeley (Boal! Hall); M.A. 1999, 
University of Toronto. - Ed. Jack Coons and Steve Smith provided critical comments on a 
draft of this Review, for the acuity and generosity of which I am exceedingly grateful. Grati­
tude of another sort prompts me to dedicate this Review, first, to Michael Bossone, Tiffany 
Hamilton, Leslie Mamaghani, and Tammy Vavra, members of the ASU administration or 
staff whose competence and cheer make it possible for my writing and teaching to go for­
ward despite the administrative burden we share; and, second, to Michael Berch, Jon Rose, 
and Owen Jones, colleagues at ASU whose friendship and exemplary professionalism make 
a pleasure of what would otherwise be the impossible. Additional thanks go to Trish White, 
than whom a more supportive Dean cannot, I would wager, be located. The last of these first 
words concerns my fiancee, Jaime Daddona, who daily shows me the lived meaning of love's 
priority. 
1. Jacques Maritain, Language and the Theory of Sign, in FRONTIERS IN SEMIOTICS 51, 
53 (John N. Deely et al. eds., 1986). 
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size is that it was someone's - or rather a group's - act of meaning. 
But those who come later cannot count on the Stone to make that 
meaning known. Meaning, if it is to be found or made, first has to be 
desired. This desire and the method of its satisfaction are James Boyd 
White's2 concern in The Edge of Meaning. And what is at issue, if 
White be correct, is human life itself: 
I think that this is as deep a need as a human being has: a need of the 
mind or soul, the need for what we call meaning in life. When it becomes 
clear that there is no way of meeting it, a person may die, either by sim­
ply withering away or by suicide. (p. 7) 
Sometimes White is said to be among those pursuing interdiscipli­
nary studies in law. And to be sure, in this book as in White's earlier 
writings, one finds learning and insight that are of interest to lawyer, 
classicist, literary critic, philosopher, and theologian alike. But against 
the background of what is going forward (or backward) in the name of 
interdisciplinarity,3 to lump White in with the "interdisciplinarians" is 
to miss the point. The typical interdisciplinary claim is that law, 
hitherto (seemingly) autonomous, needs to be supplemented by, or 
understood with the help of, something outside or beyond itself, such 
as economics, queer theory, moral philosophy, or the like.4 Indeed at 
one time White himself flirted with understanding his work as con­
tributing "toward the definition of a new subject, with a new method, 
linking the fields of law and literature and perhaps classics and 
anthropology as well."5 But White resisted this categorization because 
the world opened to him by reading texts as he does is a world he 
"see[s] as one."6 In The Edge of Meaning, as in his earlier books, 
White cuts across the borders that artificially divide disciplines and 
their methods, by cutting below to the very method by which humans 
create and discover meaning, across the breadth of human living, law 
included. 
The Edge of Meaning is an idea brilliantly conceived, magisterially 
realized. Its pedagogy is the one White has perfected over the last 
third of a century, viz., a self-conscious and theoretically original, but 
fluid and fluent movement among all kinds of acts of meaning, all of it 
2. L. Hart Wright Collegiate Professor of Law, Professor of English, Adjunct Professor 
of Classical Studies, University of Michigan. 
3. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: lnterdisciplinarity, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1217 
(2002). 
4. See Richard A Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 
100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). 
5. JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND 
RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY xiii (1985) [hereinafter 
WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING]. 
6. See id. 
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with an eye to the deepest human sources and springs of meaning.7 In 
this graceful study, we encounter with White texts of Plato, Thoreau, 
Twain, Homer, Frost, and Herbert, as well as paintings of Vermeer 
and Rembrandt. In addition, interspersed among these encounters are 
a chapter on how one learns to read a foreign language (here, ancient 
Greek), another on how what we call the "sentence" structures our 
experience, and finally one on the place of composition in law's mak­
ing. These are all principally occasions for learning by doing, in 
response to the bidding of a challenging guide. 
White is not about getting some "information" across (we are too 
used to reducing life's moments to FYI points), he is not willing to 
attempt to bore us into submission.8 Rather, he hopes - the book is 
full of hope - to improve us. The hope need not be in vain. Readers 
who choose to travel with White through The Edge of Meaning will be 
a little transformed: into persons who better understand how they 
desire meaning and make it together in their common but imperfect 
languages. I use the word 'transformed' advisedly. While it risks 
portending a Great Awakening that cannot occur, it telegraphs that 
for White, what he shares with us would contribute to who we shall be. 
The meaning we make and discover is, in the idiom White has made 
familiar, constitutive of who we are, both as individuals and as 
community.9 Yes, meanings have a communicative function, but they 
inevitably also exercise a constitutive function. 
[E]ach moment is the opportunity for a new sentence, remaking one's 
language and culture, remaking one's relations with others, redefining 
one's own mind and character. This is the essence of moral life; its ir­
reducibility to rules or principles of imitation. This is a point at which we 
engage in creation. (pp. 128-29) 
So much for speed reading. 
Given that White hopes to affect and alter us, we should wish to 
make up our minds about who this James Boyd White - who the 
publisher informs us is Hart Wright Professor of Law, professor of 
English, and adjunct professor of classical studies in the University of 
Michigan - really is. Reaching a judgment about White's character is 
7. See, e.g., JAMES BOYD WHITE, ACTS OF HOPE: CREATING AUTHORITY IN 
LITERATURE, LAW, AND POLITICS (1994); JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECJ'ATION TO 
EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION (1999) [hereinafter WHITE, FROM 
EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE 
RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW (1985); JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS 
TRANSLATION: AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL AND LEGAL CRITICISM (1990) [hereinafter 
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION]; JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION: 
STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LEGAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973); WHITE, WHEN 
WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 5. 
8. On boring one's audience into submission, see Paul F. Campos, A Heterodox Cate­
chism, in AGAINST THE LAW 7, 11 (Paul F. Campos et al. eds., 1996). 
9. See, e.g., WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at xiv, 101-02; WHITE, 
WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING, supra note 5, at 266-67. 
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not extracurricular, an ad hominem frolic and detour. Yes, this is a 
book review; but the book is a person's speech, and what we should 
make of someone's speech turns in part on the character of the 
speaker whose act of meaning it is. The mendacious may mouth the 
same sounds as those of which the sincere also are capable, but the 
meanings beyond the sounds are toto caelo apart; and it is we, not the 
mendacious, who become silly if we do not bother to ask whether it is 
mendacity or sincerity we face. 
Ponder then, in this light, what White reveals of his own self as he 
plumbs the poetry of the seventeenth-century Anglican divine George 
Herbert: 
I think the question at the center of [all Herbert's poetry] is not whether 
his Lord is a God of love, but whether he can imagine that he himself, 
with all his faults of mind and character, is loved. As readers of the book 
we know of course that he can, for at least in my experience it is not pos­
sible to read through this sincere and intelligent and scathingly honest 
verse of self-searching without in s9me sense feeling love for the person 
who speaks to us in such a courageous and open way. (p. 216) 
In this passage White manifests in a moment the self one feels one 
comes to know from the heights and depths he reaches not only 
throughout The Edge of Meaning but in all his many writings - a 
person who himself is sincere, intelligent, honest, courageous, open. 
Throughout The Edge of Meaning, White again gently but arrestingly 
distinguishes himself as one of this generation's great teachers - not 
just about how to think about Greek philosophy, American poetry, or 
the judicial opinion, but about how to think about all these and so 
many other subjects and disciplines, because of what he teaches us 
about how we stand, or should stand, in relation to one another. From 
White we learn that meaning is as fragile as it is important, and that 
even what we should value most is always "subject to threat" (p. 281 ), 
including the threat that is our own indifference or unwillingness. 
White shows us how it is up to us to constitute ourselves as more than 
brute beasts, by creating meaning and valuing the valuable. If I have a 
worry about where White stands, it concerns whether in his well­
placed insistence on meaning he has slighted value - I return to this 
concern below. 
The notion that we are being constituted through sharing meaning 
is strong medicine for those who fancy themselves nicely constituted 
as they already stand (or slouch), but there is still more medicine. 
What White says about faith in other areas of human inquiry, he 
would apply to law exemplarily: 
In looking at paintings for their meaning, as in reading poems, we focus 
upon details, then shift to structure, then return to details, then shift our 
perspective, asking other questions, then return to where we began, and 
so forth, in an endless process. It is a search for meaning; it rests upon a 
faith that the picture, or the text, will yield meaning, in the form of its 
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various meanings and beyond them too. It is the same faith, I believe, 
with which the biologist studies the cell, the astronomer the stars; a faith 
that the universe has meaning and that we can apprehend it, seeing what 
is really there; even more, that as parts of the universe, parts of the crea­
tion, we too are bearers of meaning. (p. 287; emphasis added) 
White turns out, then, to be a case in point in Steven Smith's porten­
tous observation that "it may now be possible, for the first time in a 
long time, to consider the possibility of a jurisprudence that under­
stands law as an expression of faith."10 
11. METHOD AND MEANING 
Facing up to the place of faith in law is risky business, for, as Smith 
observes, " [i]n modern academic discourse, 'faith' is sometimes under­
stood not in terms of what it is, but rather in terms of what it suppos­
edly is not - that is, 'reason.' So 'faith' becomes almost by definition a 
form of irrational, or at best, nonrational belief."11 But a great virtue 
of White's work is that it shows us that what we do in law, at least 
when we do it well, makes sense, even if it turns out that the center 
holds through acts of (what we refer to as) faith, rather than through, 
say, the feats of Ronald Dworkin's Hercules. 1 2  I shall return below to 
faith's place in law. I mention Hercules here in order to call attention 
to the fact that we are used to the idea (even if we sometimes resist it) 
that we can understand what we do in law by thinking about how 
someone superhuman would do the job. But John Noonan was surely 
right to observe, "It is strange to talk of Hercules when your starting 
point is Harry Blackmun."13 Quite simply, Dworkin's superhuman 
"judge of method"1 4  is a distraction from the hard facts about the 
human methods by which we can, if we would choose, order our living 
so as to create meaning and instantiate value. Acceding to this plea for 
a human touchstone in legal thinking, we might then hasten to agree 
with Steven Winter that "law is no different than any other product of 
human cognition."15 But have we bothered to get to know our own 
cognitive ways and means? Alas, Joseph Vining remains right: "We 
hardly know ourselves."16 Happily for us, White (like Vining himself) 
is an exception to the usual lawyerly lack of self-awareness, and he has 
written this new book in aid of our satisfying the imperative given at 
10. Steven D. Smith, Believing Like a Lawyer, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1041, 1048 (1999). 
1 1. Id. at 1098. 
12. See RONALD DWORKIN, LA W'S EMPIRE 239 (1986). 
13. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 174 (1976). 
14. DWORKIN, supra note 12, at 240. 
15.  Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Metaphoric Reasoning, and the Cogni­
tive Stake for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (1989). 
16. JOSEPH VINING, FROM NEWTON'S SLEEP 344 (1995). 
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Delphi. Reading White, we get to know White; we also get to know 
ourselves, and, in particular, something of the method by which we 
avoid madness. 
In jurisprudential circles today, method has something of a bad 
reputation, associated as it is with the "legal process" movement that 
failed even on its own terms.17 But White must be credited with the 
insights that it is through a cognitive method, rather than through the 
shortcut of an epiphanic moment of cognitive magic or mystery, that 
we humans create and discover meaning; and that that method is the 
very way of being of the properly human self. White, I should note, 
prefers the word process to refer to what I shall call a method; but, for 
reasons to which I shall come, I think that what White has in mind is 
more reliably signaled by the word method, and that conceiving of 
what is at issue more clearly as method helps avoid strains on White's 
thinking. White begins to call attention to this method/process as he 
offers his reasons for the diversity of works he explores: 
One of the points of this diversity is to make it easier for us to see, and 
begin to analyze, the process at work in all of them; another is to begin to 
show how different people, located in different cultural contexts and 
working in different genres, address in significantly different ways the 
possibilities and difficulties inherent in the process in which we are all 
engaged. (p. xi) 
White then offers the following phenomenology of that method/ 
process: 
I think that in each of us there is a part of our being that is the source of 
mental life and imagination; that, without our being wholly aware of it, in 
this part of the self we are constantly asking a set of questions about the 
world, of which the deepest is the question of meaning as I have defined it 
above, namely, whether we can find or make an adequate way of imag­
ining the world, and the self and others within it; that to ask this question 
is to involve us in trying to respond to it, which in turn brings us to face 
the adequacies and inadequacies of the languages we are given to speak, 
of the cultures we inhabit, and the constraints imposed on us by nature as 
well; that our engagement with these questions is for the most part un­
conscious, but can be made the object of attention and thought, particu­
larly through the careful reading and study of certain works of literature 
and other forms of art, including the art of law; indeed that to ni.ake us 
aware of this process and our own participation in it, and to teach us how 
to think about and criticize our own performances of it, is one of.the cen­
tral functions of art; and, finally, that we pursue these questions not alone 
but in relation to others, with whom we make real whatever we manage 
to learn. The process to which I am drawing attention is thus one in 
which we all engage, all the time, but do so for the most part outside the 
17. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Introduction to HENRY M. HART, 
JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW cxiii (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
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field of conscious awareness - it is a piece of that rich and complex life 
that takes place in the ocean of the mind, beneath the surface on which 
we consciously live. But it does manifest itself constantly in what we say 
and do; not explicitly, but in our performances with language and each 
other. (pp. xi-xii; emphasis added) 
White's own book is an offering of a piece of art that has among its 
purposes the knowing of the self: "At the place or moment to which 
art can in this way lead us, we naturally find ourselves asking questions 
of many kinds, about the world, about language, and about the self" 
(p. 4). White continues: 
The deepest question, I think, the one at the center of it all, unites all 
three topics: it is whether we can find, or make, a way of imagining the 
self and the world and others within it that will fit with our experience -
enable us to have experience - in such a way as to make possible coher­
ent and valuable forms of speech and thought and action. The major aim 
of this book will be to focus attention on this question, showing how cer­
tain writers have addressed it and made it available to us, and in this way 
to make it the object of thought. (p. 4) 
The Edge of Meaning, then, is animated by a "deepest ques­
tion,"(p. 4; internal quotation marks omitted) and concerns the "part 
of the self" (p. xii) in (or by) which "we are constantly asking a set of 
questions" (p. xii). White thus contributes a desperately needed 
corrective to the underappreciation of the place of the question in 
human living. The operative assumption, subject to the rare exception, 
is that the asking of questions is epiphenomena! to human knowing, 
the latter occurring (if at all) by the mind's eye's taking a sort of 
mental look. The usual, if unarticulated, thinking is that knowing 
occurs by the mind's getting its version of 20/20 vision - "the view 
from nowhere," with nothing allowed to obnubilate the mental looks. 
But notice this stark fact: the mind that asks no questions, reaches no 
answers. In other words, gaping at the Rosetta Stone gets you 
nowhere. Without asking, "What does this mean?" or "What should I 
do?," I shall not know. Period. But I do ask such questions, all the 
time, as do you. (Do you not?) We ask these questions because we 
desire to know. In calling attention to the foundational position of our 
questioning, White stands in the tradition of Aristotle, who began his 
Metaphysics with a wondrous observation: "All men by nature desire 
to know."18 As one contemporary commentator explains, "This radical 
dynamism, both longing and capacity, without which we would never 
be drawn to know anything, is inborn within us, defining our nature as 
1 8. 1 ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS 114 (W.0. Ross ed., 1924); see also 2 ARISTOTLE, 
POSTERIOR ANALYTICS 1 75 (Hugh Tredennick ed. & trans., 1960) ("There are four kinds of 
question that we ask, and they correspond to the kinds of things that we know. They are: the 
question of fact, the question of reason or cause, the question of existence, and the question 
of essence . . . .  These are the four kinds of question which we ask and the four kinds of 
knowledge which we have when we have discovered the answers. "). 
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human and not merely animal."19 And another twentieth-century 
philosopher, Bernard Lonergan, refines the point as he develops the 
implications of Aristotle's locating erotic desire at the root of our 
human knowing: "[Our] primordial drive [to understand] is the pure 
question. It is prior to any insights, any concepts, any words, for 
insights, concepts, words, have to do with answers; and before we look 
for answers, we want them; such wanting is the pure question."20 
We want to be knowers, even know-it-alls. To be sure, we can be 
lazy, and often we are even proud. So, at times we attend more to 
answers previously amassed than to the normative significance of our 
insatiable asking of the fresh questions in our quest for new answers. 
Eager to take a rest, we codify our answers, transmuting questions' 
answers into collections of propositions. There is wisdom in organizing 
and perhaps appropriating what we have received (a point to which I 
shall return below), but there is sloth in pointing to the encyclopedia 
or the Restatement (Seventh) of Everything. A mischievous Yale 
Divinity student was on the trail of this anaesthesia of intelligence 
when he tacked to his door an advertisement for Thomas Aquinas's 
Summa Theologiae that included this vaunt: "Contains the sum-total 
of philosophical and theological wisdom." The advertising was false in 
at least the following two respects. The first is obvious: there is 
more to be learnt. The second proves harder to live with: wisdom or 
knowledge, when it exists, is in the mind, not in the black marks on the 
printed page. 
I do not mean that the black marks necessarily mean nothing 
whatever. The claim, rather, is an instance of the more general point 
that while the truth is independent of us, even the truth is not so objec­
tive as to be able to get by without the mind of the human subject.21 
Some readers of the Summa are dull and blunt, others insightful and 
acute. What the reader brings as tools for understanding makes a 
critical difference. The mind and meaning of Aquinas fare better in 
the mind of a John of Saint Thomas than in the mind of a dullard. As 
philosopher Joseph Flanagan explains, "It is not language that 
explains knowing, but knowing that explains language . . . .  [M]eanings, 
while carried in words, depend primarily not on the words themselves, 
but on the prior acts of knowing that explain and ground the acts of 
meaning."22 And as knowing, it is, as I have been suggesting, neither 
more nor less than asking questions and answering them. "Knowing 
19. W. NORRIS CLARKE, THE ONE AND THE MANY 14 (2001). 
20. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 9 (3d 
ed. 1970) [hereinafter LONERGAN, INSIGHT]. 
21 .  BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, Introduction to A SECOND COLLECTION (1974) (fifth 
page of unpaginated introduction). 
22,. JOSEPH FLANAGAN, QUEST FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY IN LONERGAN'S 
PHILOSOPHY 1 82 (1997). 
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consists in answering questions. Meaningless questions and meaning­
less answers are neither questions nor answers. If our knowledge is 
constituted by answering questions, our knowledge is constituted by 
meaning."23 It is meaning all the way down, or it's gibberish. (The 
meaning concerns something real or imagined; but that something real 
or imagined can be, but is not necessarily, itself meaning). 
To be sure, all this will seem very paradoxical to the common 
strain of thought that identifies our knowing with something like 
perception or sensation, and, on that basis, accords the greatest (or 
only) reality to what we can see or touch. But knowing does not come 
to pass thanks only to seeing or touching. If all you do is gape or 
touch, your experience will be meaningless, as the poor American 
disappointed by the Rosetta Stone half realized. Meaning has no 
spatial location, but without it we wither. And it is thus that it is a 
mark of the passage from childish ways to adulthood to discover that 
there is no consolation in the puerile wish: "Sticks and stones will 
break my bones, but names will never hurt me." A life free from sticks 
and stones but lacking meaning, is hardly a human life. It is only slight 
overstatement to say, " [h]uman living really is a struggle for meaning, 
an effort, because meaning is constituent of human living. The effort 
to live is fundamentally the struggle for meaning."24 And law, of 
course, when there is any, is not sticks and stones (though it may both 
use these and try to prevent their use), but (in part) meaning, of a 
certain sort. As Lonergan observes: 
[I]f you want to do a study of law courts and go in with a machine that 
will measure the decibels of the sounds made by the different speakers or 
the arrangement of people in the room on different sides and places, and 
so on, you will not understand anything about the law court. "25 
What you will have missed is the meaning of it all. But if law is consti­
tuted (in part) by meaning, of a certain sort, then law is the product of 
asking and answering certain questions, in a certain way. 
It is a demerit of much of work in law that it blunders forward 
without ever getting clear on how we know what it is we claim, in law, 
to know. Professor Glendon may be right that many of our best legal 
minds are so busy doing law well that they do not stop to describe 
23. 6 BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, The Analogy of Meaning, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
BERNARD LONERGAN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS 1958-1 964, at 183, 
198-99 (Robert C. Croken et al. eds., 1 996) (hereinafter LONERGAN, The Analogy of Mean­
ing]. 
24. 6 BERNARD J. F. LONERGAN, Time and Meaning, in COLLECTED WORKS OF 
BERNARD LONERGAN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL PAPERS, supra note 23, at 94, 
106. 
25. LONERGAN, The Analogy of Meaning, supra note 23, at 204. For a marvelous decon­
struction of an attempt to treat knowing law as simple "seeing, " see PAUL KAHN, THE 
REIGN OF LAW 222-29 (1997). 
May 2003] Meaning's Edge, Love's Priority 2069 
their method;26 but Professor Posner is also right that we are much too 
used to cottoning to propositions, even "neutral principles," in light of 
their appearing under the West or Foundation imprimatur, 'their 
having been authored by Professor Sterling of the Elite Law School.27 
Thanks to Legal Realism's airing the possibility that Sterling is in 
reality a Gilding, questions of legal justification are getting raised all 
the time. Frequently and familiarly, they are answered with a more or 
less thoroughgoing skepticism (itself lacking epistemic warrant, of 
course) - whereupon law is shown the exit as "policy science" is 
ushered in on a sedan chair. The ensuing response assumes any 
number of forms, all of which would work a reconstructive miracle 
courtesy of various epistemic wonders, the range of which has been 
catalogued and deconstructed by Pierre Schlag.28 The result, as Steven 
Smith has shown splendidly, is that much of what we say in law seems, 
upon sober reflection, to be nonsense29 - so we avoid sobriety. 
But in White's work, there is no nonsense, but instead an honest 
appropriation of what we are doing when we are making and discov­
ering meaning, including meaning that amounts to law. White cuts 
through all the nonsense by going to the root of both problem and so­
lution. As White shows time and again - from the meaning of a 
Greek sentence to the meaning of a statute - the criteria for giving 
(or withholding) assent or consent are given on the side of the human 
subject. Nothing is evident, let alone self-evident, except to a mind 
that has satisfied, as to the issue in question, its desire to know. When 
propositions are not self-authenticating, when starting points are not 
self-moving marionettes, when reality isn't forcing itself upon us (and 
it never forces itself upon the mind, we can always deceive ourselves) 
- then, we are remitted to the process of asking and answering ques­
tions, answers being achieved only by the subject's satisfying the desire 
to know. "It is," White says, "a matter of having questions, and 
pursuing them as far as one can" (p. 101). 
If this insistence, that knowing is through question-and-answer, 
still seems otiose (distinctions without real difference), notice that the 
spectacular success of modern science is the result of the working out 
of the logic of question-and-answer. The scientist does not simply see 
or otherwise sense. Science is generated by the asking and answering 
of questions. The scientist questions his experience (What does this 
mean?), interprets those experiences, makes a formulation of that 
understanding of experience, and then reaches a judgment about 
26. MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 231 (1994). 
27. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 70-71 (1995). 
28. See Pierre J. Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 1627 (1991); see 
also PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998). 
29. STEVEN D. SMITH, LAW'S QUANDARY (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author). 
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whether the data that are his experience support that understanding 
(Is this really so? How probable is this?). The questions one asks 
control what one can come to know; the person who does no more 
than experience or imagine will know nothing. Nor, moreover, will we 
know very much unless we allow our knowing to build on what others 
have already known. One cannot say this without the obligatory 
quoting of Newton: "If I have been able to see farther than others, it 
was because I stood on the shoulders of giants."30 What allowed 
modern science to take off as it did was its becoming a methodical 
asking and answering of questions. "Method," as Lonergan explains, 
"is not a set of rules to be followed meticulously by a dolt,"31 turning 
out recipe-like the same result every time. Method is not a set of rules 
at all. Method is, rather, "a normative pattern of recurrent and related 
operations yielding progressive and cumulative results."32 When the 
asking and answering of a specific type of question occurs not episodi­
cally but repeatedly and in light of past answers to the same type of 
question, progressive and cumulative results become possible and then 
actual. "The wheel of method not only turns but also rolls along."33 
But none of this happens as it should unless we choose to allow it to 
happen; instead of choosing to be methodical we can drift or gawk. 
Which is why I prefer the label 'method' to White's 'process.' Process 
in modern parlance tends to denote what happens automatically; 
'method', to my mind at least, signals the need to choose to be 
methodical if knowledge is to enter and grow. 
So spectacular has been the success of modern science, that, alas, it 
has filled the common mind with the common nonsense that only in 
the natural sciences, and certainly not in the affairs of human living, 
can knowing occur and progress. But we do ask - and we likely try to 
avoid the company of those who do not ask - sincerely, the Socratic 
question: "What should I do?" Answers to the "What should I do?" 
question, like questions about protons, may be hard to arrive at; but 
the fact that knowledge makes "a bloody entrance"34 proves not that 
knowledge is impossible, but that, if what is possible is to become 
actual, something is required of those who would reach it. No ques-
30. Quoted in ARTHUR KOESTELLER, THE ACT OF CREATION: A STUDY OF THE 
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS PROCESSES OF HUMOR, SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY, AND ART 
124 (Danube ed., 1976). 
31. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY xi (Seabury paperback ed., 
1979) (hereinafter LONERGAN, METHOD IN THEOLOGY). 
32. Id. at 4. 
33. Id. at 5. For a compendious treatment of these issues, see Patrick McKinley Bren­
nan, Realizing the Rule of Law in the Human Subject, 43 B.C. L. REV. 227, 277-83 (2002). 
34. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 20, at 186. In his work nearly two decades later, 
philosopher Bernard Lonergan references knowledge's "bloody entrance" specifically in the 
context of the movement from ordinary language to theory. LONERGAN, METHOD IN 
THEOLOGY, supra note 31, at 85. 
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tions, no answers; no answers, no knowing. No building on (and cor­
recting) what has been handed down, no possibility of progress. There 
are, to be sure, currents of thought that deny that there are answers to 
the Socratic question. B ut here we do well to recall the courageous 
honesty of that analytical philosopher of the last century, Elizabeth 
Anscombe. In her judgment, the person who would smartly assert ne­
science as to, say, the comparative worth of a piece of straw and a 
village of innocents, would show us all a "corrupt mind," a mind with 
which she would decline to have commerce.35 Almost no one wants to 
reveal a corrupt mind. "[O]ne may be willing to play the buffoon,  but 
one wants to do it intelligently."36 Who will be heard to say, at least for 
long, that he knows nothing of an answer to the Socratic question? We 
answer this question all the time, as did our forebears; White shows us 
something of how it's done. And that it is done, makes all the differ­
ence: 
The ultimate basis of our knowing is not necessity but contingent fact, 
and the fact is established, not prior to our engagement in knowing, but 
simultaneously with it. The sceptic, then, is not involved in a conflict with 
absolute necessity. He might not be; he might not be a knower. Contra­
diction arises when he utilizes cognitional process to deny it.37 
III. HUMANS ARE EQUAL? 
One of the virtually unfailing contributions of White's work is 
an exorcising of the Platonism of Forms that operates undetected in 
so many of us so much of the time.38 In The Edge of Meaning the 
exorcism is worked in every chapter; page by page we are delivered 
from the grip of the delusion that we can (if we would) see, and do not 
have to labor to discover, what is real, what is worthwhile. This liber­
ating challenge is worked most pointedly at the heart of the book, 
through a rich reading of Plato's Phaedrus. Space doesn't allow justice 
to be done to that reading here, but White himself, as he turns from 
Plato to Frost and Herbert, offers this apt encapsulation of it: 
The point about Plato's doctrine of the Eternal Forms, in this dialogue at 
least, is thus not to assert the truth of their existence, which can after all 
never be known or observed while we live, but to define, by their ab­
sence, what human life, as we actually know it, lacks. The myth is a way 
of drawing attention to the fact that knowledge of the Forms is denied us. 
We must live on conditions of radical uncertainty; and it is to show us 
how this might be done without collapsing into incoherence or despair 
that the dialogue exists .... (p. 189) 
35. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, in 33 PHILOSOPHY 1 (1958). 
36. LONERGAN, The Analogy of Meaning, supra note 23, at 224. 
37. LONERGAN, INSIGHT, supra note 20, at 332. 
38. On such Platonism in modern legal theory, see SMITH, supra note 29, at 241-50. 
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It is a question of fact, of course, whether we have access to a tran­
scending Form of, say, justice, and each of us must answer for himself. 
My own judgment, as I have implied, is that I have been denied all 
such access; nor, as a matter in fact, do I know anyone else who will 
admit to thinking differently of his own case (though easy talk about 
"intuitions" of this or that should make the hearer nervous). Yet, from 
the absence of Forms there does not follow necessarily a living in 
"conditions of radical uncertainty." Again, it is a question of fact. How 
uncertain in fact are the grounds of our choosing and deciding? 
White does not exemplify "living on conditions of radical uncer­
tainty," at least not when it comes to some very important matters. 
One thing White seems to know is that we are, all of us, equals and 
worthy of treatment as equals. Evidence this sentence: "The proper 
object of human community is the recognition of the equal value of 
each person as a center of worth and meaning . . . .  "39 And this one: 
There is nothing that I would hold to more dearly in our past than the 
language of the Declaration of Independence, "all men are created 
equal. ... " Yet upon what does this value of equality rest? Is it self­
evident? Certainly not, and one may find oneself in deep trouble trying 
to rest it upon independent philosophical foundations.40 
Notwithstanding the troubles, White affirms the equality of humans as 
a fact that should shape our conduct, and does so without evident 
equivocation or modality. What, then, would be the foundations on 
which White takes this firm stance? Is it the case that a linguistic lump, 
written more than two hundred years ago, is White's last word on this 
topic? 
White has suggested that the equality asserted in the Declaration, 
and put to work by Lincoln, may depend upon a Christian metaphysics 
of creation (the Declaration does, after all, have us "created" equal).41 
Responding to those who would purge our common language of what 
cannot be sustained without religious supports, White continues: 
To remit ourselves entirely to the language of twentieth-century political 
philosophy would I think involve a great loss of power and significance in 
our language of fundamental value. I at least would not want our legal 
and political language to be one in which the Declaration of Independ­
ence made no sense.42 
Language "of fundamental value" that fails to make sense, is (perni­
cious) nonsense - and White, as I have said, doesn't go for nonsense. 
But given the truth is not so objective as to be able to get by without 
the mind of the human subject, there is intellectual work for us to do 
39. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at 269. 
40. WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE, supra note 7, at 145-46. 
41. Id. at 146-47. 
42. Id. at 147. 
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here, notwithstanding White's own confident (if precatory) assertions. 
Does the Declaration's assertion of equality make sense to us; and if it 
does, on what basis? Philosopher P. Christopher Smith grasps both 
horns of the dilemma: "Ostensibly, of course, logic's monological 
demonstration presents to silent onlookers the inferences to be drawn 
necessarily from any individual's insights into necessary and certain 
self-evident truths - see the starting point . . . .  of Jefferson's apparent 
demonstration, 'We hold these truths to be self-evident .. .. ' "43 But in 
fact, Smith continues, 
any attempt to substitute logical demonstration for rhetorical conviction 
only falsifies this circumstance [of assent] and opens the way for propa­
gandistic manipulation in the guise of "objectivity." (Even Jefferson, 
whose goal is to win consent to a revolutionary act, finds himself con­
strained to disguise his rhetorical exhortation and defense as a demon­
stration seeking only assent to a proposition).44 
That White's embrace of the first substantive component of the 
Declaration - the equality of humans - is neither propaganda nor 
manipulation, emerges for me from what he culls from Mark Twain's 
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn. On White's reading, Huck 
"comes to challenge race and slavery in his conduct, even while 
affirming [them] in his language and his 'conscience,' " by adopting 
the following method: "He learns to test everything by his own imme­
diate experience" (p. 36). As White elaborates Huck's method: "The 
irresolvable inconsistencies between his two worlds" - the world of 
nature and the river, and the world of the city, Petersburg - "lead 
him to develop the habit of turning to his own experience, confused 
and untutored though it is, as the only possible standard of judgment" 
(p. 37). This method is the right one, according to White; which is not 
to say that it is infallible: 
This practice naturally generates a mixture of error, superstition, and ac­
curate perception, and he, naturally enough, does not know which is 
which. But to do this at all he must be resolutely, sometimes devastat­
ingly, honest with himself, both in his perceptions and in his accounts of 
them .. Although his marginality does not give him a firm place to stand, 
then, it does teach him to focus on his own expe.rience, however flawed it 
may be, as a mode of thought and reflection. And while the conflicts be­
tween his two worlds do not reach the issues of race and slavery, the 
habit of mind and attention they stimulate will ultimately do so. (p. 37) 
Huck does not become a philosopher, thank God. But the Huck 
Finn of White's sensitive reading does exemplify that part of the 
human self, of interest to White, that asks questions, and in answering 
them constitutes himself a person of a certain sort. White obscures the 
43. P. CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE HERMENEUTICS OF ORIGINAL ARGUMENT: 
DEMONSTRATION, DIALECTIC, RHETORIC 6-7 ( 1998). 
44. Id. at 7. 
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point somewhat by suggesting that Huck properly treats his brute 
experience as the "standard of judgment." But as White shows time 
and again, brute experience is a starting point, not a "standard of 
judgment." It is by questioning experience, in the way White 
describes, that Huck is able to come to a judgment that he (and we?) 
regard as correct. And answering honestly - instead of "answering" 
with the language that might have been quick off the tongue, but not 
true to experience (which is always particularized) - Huck's perform­
ance exemplifies White's observation that, "When we are working at 
our best we do not just use words with preexisting meanings, but 
create relations among them that will give them meanings of a new 
kind" (pp. 111-12). 
White demonstrates this by making sense of an expression that had 
always puzzled me upon earlier readings of Huck Finn. Huck declines 
law's command to surrender Jim on the heels of a prompt from his 
" 'conscience' " to turn in "this nigger, which I had as good as helped 
to run away . . . .  "45 Promptly reflecting on his radical reversal of 
course, Huck - stuck between his judgment that he had "done 
wrong" and his contemporaneous judgment that had he "done right" 
he would have felt just as bad - concludes: "So I reckoned I wouldn't 
bother no more about it, but after this always do whichever come 
handiest at the time" (p. 34). "Handiest" had always rankled in my 
mind as facile in a way Huck had just refused to be - and White 
shows why a reading such as mine is wrong. The (superlative) adjec­
tive "is given content by the kind of moral reflection and action in 
which Huck is engaging: it means . . .  the course of conduct that con­
forms to one's deepest moral and emotional intuitions" (p. 111). A 
dictionary-shopping Supreme Court, by contrast, would have Huck's 
animadversion upon his great moment come to some version of the 
following (if, that is, the Court elected to consult Random House Web­
ster's Unabridged Dictionary in its Second Edition): a resolve to do 
what is most "within easy reach; conveniently available; accessible . .  . 
convenient or useful . . . skillful with the hands; deft; dexterous . .  . 
easily maneuvered . . . .  " 46 
IV. GETTING IT RIGHT 
Of course, the Supreme Court does not read novels; but the 
Justices of the Court do read a lot (not to mention write), and the 
consequences of the Justices' reading skills affect how we all stand in 
relation to one another. White has much to say about how the Justices 
should read (and write), about, specifically, how being constituted as a 
45. P. 34 (internal citation omitted); MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF 
HUCKLEBERRY FINN 98 (1985). 
46. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 867 (2d ed. 2001). 
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court (or rather, this Court) should inform what one reads for. A 
concomitant of White's sound insistence on law as (in part) constitu­
tive conversation is the affirmation that we have (ineluctably but also 
by intelligent design) our different roles in the conversation, positions 
that themselves have to be claimed and argued for, this on the basis of 
texts the authority of which itself needs justifying.47 Speaking of a law­
yer who has hewed to the method White clarifies and commends, and 
who then finds herself faced say with two lines of cases pointing in 
opposite directions, White concedes, " [y]ou are in a sense free to 
choose whichever way you want to go . . . .  " Then, however, he adds 
immediately: " [B]ut that hardly helps, for the question remains: How 
should you exercise the freedom you have?" (p. 251). This, the 
Socratic question, won't go away, at least not for more than a moment 
at a time. And its answer, White continues, 
certainly ought not rest on whim or untutored reactions, but rather on a 
process of thought and reflection, as you seek to organize the material on 
both sides into a manageable whole, in light of what you take to be the 
central values expressed in [the relevant text] and in the cases decided 
under it. The end of the process will not be a moment of perfect clarifica­
tion, but an action on your part, a decision, with its roots in the world be­
yond words, ultimately a mystery even to you. (pp. 251-52) 
What White here refers to as "a process of thought and reflection," 
White elsewhere elaborates in these terms: " [T]he law is nothing if it is 
not a way of paying attention and respect to what is outside of our­
selves: to texts made by others in the past, which we regard as authori­
tative, and to texts made in the present by our fellow citizens, to which 
we listen" (p. 91). White specifies the aim of that "way of paying atten­
tion and respect," but not exhaustively. 
The object of law is justice; but the law teaches us, over and over again, 
that we do not have unmediated access to the pure idea of justice in the 
heavens, which we can apply directly and with confidence, but rather live 
in a world in which everything has to be thought about, argued out, and 
reimagined afresh. (pp. 250-51) 
47. White writes: 
In the law ... every speaker is particularly located, both rhetorically and socially. He or she 
is a lawyer or a judge, a judge of a state or a federal court, a lawyer arguing to a jury or 
making a motion to a judge, and in every instance is situated as well with reference to a set 
of prior and arguably authoritative texts: constitutions, statutes, earlier cases, and the like. 
This is the context in which "policy" questions are discussed in law, and these conversations 
receive their proper shape from that context. The authority of the legal actor is never self­
established, but always rests, at least in argument, upon prior texts, which provide the stan­
dards that govern the authority they establish. This means, among other things, that the legal 
speaker must always look outside himself for his source of authority; that his every action 
rests upon a claimed interpretation of those sources of authority; and that these interpreta­
tions, of necessity, are compositions to which he asks that authority be given. 
WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at 96. 
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I suggested above that White's work combats the Platonism that 
threatens to skew our thinking heavenward, and the above passage is 
something of a case in point. But it strikes me as itself laden with a 
trace of latent Platonism. Justice is reified, and then we are merely 
cautioned only that "we do not have unmediated access to the pure 
idea of justice in the heavens" (p. 250). Having been reminded that the 
heavens are off limits, this reader hoped for an insistent reminder that 
it is, then, to the earth and its inhabitants, in all their amplitude, that 
we can and must look to settle how we should stand to one another. 
Yes, in "the world beyond words," but in the world (p. 1). Even if God 
grants revelation, He grants it to us here where we live; he does not, so 
far as I know, invite any of us to Heaven for (mediated) fireside chats 
and then send us back down here to do what we have been told to do. 
And if God does reveal instructions for human living (in, say, Ten 
Commandments given at Sinai), these. too, like the Rosetta Stone, 
await their being read and interpreted. Even truth that purports to be 
divine, is not so objective as to be able to get by without the mind of 
the human subject. White knows this, but on occasion in his writing, 
justice seems to assume a form to which it is not, I think, entitled. 
I return to a larger-than-life example of this in the final Section, 
but first I call attention to another element of the passage just quoted. 
Initially, White tells us that we "live in a world in which everything has 
to be thought about, argued out, and reimagined afresh" (p. 251). Is 
there in this observation a whiff of the modern rationalist of whom 
Michael Oakeshott says: " [H]e strives to live each day as if it were his 
first."48 We know White better than that. White is a self-conscious 
participant in an intergenerational conversation, both learning from 
and adding to, possibly even correcting, what has been handed down. 
By picking up where others left off, rather than striving to live every 
day as if it were his first, the inquiring mind doesn't have to start from 
scratch, though of course one may have occasion to correct what one 
has inherited. Again Newton tumbles to mind. Trouble is, whereas in 
the natural sciences we are ready to grant that what is inherited is not 
dead weight but a helpful starting point, with regard to questions 
about how to live, many among us are poised to deny tradition any 
positive role whatever. We imagine that scientific method's success 
owes nothing to its being a particular form and deployment of the 
cognitive method by which our knowing occurs. We fail to live in 
accord with the (apparent) fact that our learning comes to pass discur­
sively (rather than spasmodically) - building up from experience to 
judgment by way of the interpretations we are able creatively and 
correctly to give that experience. White's work shows on every page 
how our thinking about our living, including in law, is shaped by the 
48. MICHAEL 0AKESHOTT, Rationalism in Politics, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS 1 ,  3 
(1962). 
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languages and learning we inherit, and that our learning and the value 
of our living can grow by building on, and correcting where necessary, 
what we have received.49 
Having made this case for the (potential) value to us of our intel­
lectual inheritance, it would do us well to recall that the person overly 
concerned to conserve what he has received will petrify and thus cease 
to be relevant. It is easy to talk the talk we have heard talked, easy 
to apply without thinking about them the rules handed down on an 
earlier occasion, for another case. But doing so is not only dull, but 
also unsatisfying. White's genius is to see that our radically personal, 
nondelegable desire for meaning is satisfied only by our making up 
our own minds, each of us for himself. Our desire for meaning is satis­
fied only by reaching our own judgments. We can be mistaken in these 
judgments, but this only proves that we can be correct as well. White 
makes this point as he describes how we reach the meanings of several 
pictures by Rembrandt, but he could just as well have taken as his 
example the meanings of Vermeer's paintings, Homer's Iliad, or the 
lover's smile: 
Sometimes of course we are misled or otherwise make a misjudgment, 
but this fact merely confirms the power and accuracy of our judgment as 
a general matter. Yet exactly how we read each other's appearance is a 
mystery: no objective rules, say interpreting the shape of the skull or the 
distance between the eyes or the fullness of lips, will work. This is a ca­
pacity we have and use, but one that is not wholly accessible to the con­
scious mind. (p. 282-83) 
White's work helps us bring this capacity to the reader's conscious­
ness, and what it reveals is that we constitute ourselves, we constitute 
our world by the judgments we reach. As Professor Thomas Kohler 
says, in a fine little essay that complements, from a more strictly philo­
sophical angle, White's position: 
[T]he act of judging represents a personal commitment and entails per­
sonal responsibility. When we judge, we assert or deny something about 
the character of reality, or the worth of a certain course of action. We 
thereby literally commit ourselves to a certain understanding of the 
world and its meaning .... We do not come to an understanding of real­
ity or the good by "viewing" it, but by making correct judgments about it. 
At the same time, we constitute ourselves through our judgments and de­
termine through them the sort of people we become.5 0 
White vindicates against unjustified demands for "certainty," the 
kind of knowing we do all the time that does not admit of the sort of 
49. My stance on the place of tradition and self-correction in law is indebted to Mary 
Ann Glendon, Knowledge Makes a Noisy Entrance: The Struggle for Self-Appropriation in 
Law, in 10 LONERGAN WORKSHOP 119 ( Fred Lawrence ed., 1994). 
50. Thomas C. Kohler, The Integrity of Unrestricted Desire: Community, Values, and the 
Problem of Personhood, in AUTONOMY AND ORDER: A COMMUNITARIAN ANTHOLOGY 
57, 58 (2000). 
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demonstration the scientist would be interested in. And while some­
times White's opposition to the certainists leads to assertions that we 
live and decide in conditions of radical uncertainty, White also calls 
attention to the ways in which, amidst uncertainty that may seem 
radical, we reach judgments that are correct. (Sometimes correct 
judgments will be judgments of probability, but a judgment of a prob­
ability is not a mere meaningless guess.) At the beginning I quoted 
White as saying that the search for meaning always requires "faith" on 
the part of the searcher. The assertion is provocative, but what does it 
come to? It is the fact of our knowing both meaning and value, not a 
nonrational hope for such knowing, that gives us reason both to hope 
and believe that our deep desire to know will again be satisfied. To the 
common strain of thought that persists in identifying knowing with 
seeing, all this will continue to seem spooky. The slogan has it that 
seeing is believing. But seeing is only seeing; and knowing consists in 
answering questions. Sometimes we answer our questions by relying 
on the knowings of others we know or believe to be trustworthy; the 
alternative, doubting everything one has not seen for oneself, is as silly 
as it is impossible. While White says (in the passage I quoted at the 
beginning) that we all have faith in our capacity for "seeing what is 
really there" in the universe, what White shows is the method by 
which we know even what we cannot see, the world of meaning and 
value. Never do we see meaning or value, but, at least sometimes, each 
of us knows them. To call such knowing 'faith' because it involves (as 
known) what one cannot see, does not work a linguistic sin. But the 
better course, I think, is to affirm forthrightly that the world we know 
is not exhausted by the world we can see. 
V. FALL IN LOVE, lF YOU ARE ABLE 
I have emphasized, because it is the emphasis of White's book, that 
humans desire meaning and when they lack meaning they tend to be­
come less than human. What this obscures, however, is that meaning is 
not enough. Our deepest desire extends beyond meaning to value.51 
Which mearis that, first , we want to know what things are really worth, 
second, we want our lives to instantiate the truly worthy. A piece of 
straw may mean the world to me, but if I prefer it to the lover's gaze, 
to food on the table, or to a reliable system of distribution of com­
modities of value to humans' living, then so much the worse for me 
(and alas, perhaps for the neighbors as well). We ask questions about 
what is; we ask also about what is valuable, what is worth doing, what 
relationships or states of affairs are worth bringing into existence. 
51 .  White catches this nicely in his suggestion that "the desire to understand, to make 
sense, to imagine coherently includes, or better ripens into, a desire for what Thoreau would 
call a sincere relation with another - for friendship, ultimately for love. " Pp. 69-70. 
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Questions of the latter sort are versions of what I have referred to as 
the Socratic question. "Our answers to these questions of worth make 
up part of the moral reality in which we live. It is through them, 
to paraphrase the rabbis, that we cooperate in the completion of 
creation. "52 
Value as what we desire, and valuing as something we do in 
response to a nondelegable desire to realize or instantiate the valuable 
- these, White too thinly thematizes. Value does not occur in his 
index, and when value makes the occasional explicit appearance, its 
significance is hard to gauge, as when White observes at the beginning 
of his final chapter: "In this book I have worked through a series of 
texts in which a mind can be seen as trying to imagine the world, and 
the self within it, in such a way as to make possible coherent speech 
and valuable action"(p. 257). And again: 
[W]e are collectively not very clear about exactly what it is we point to in 
[our many] uses of the word meaning. One way of putting it - which I 
know can be only the slightest of sketches, and which it is the aim of the 
rest of the book to complete - is to say that each of us constantly seeks 
to imagine the world, and the self and others within it, in such a way as to 
enable us to engage in coherent and intelligible speech, valuable and ef­
fective action. We want, that is, a way of imagining life as a whole, on 
which our own action and thought and speech, our own relations with 
others, can sensibly and effectively be based. (p. xi) 
We should agree with White that discovering ways of living that 
are meaningful requires the creativity that begins iri imagination. But 
we should observe at once that we are not satisfied by castles in 
the sky, imagined ways of living that enthrone the worthless (while 
suppressing the valuable). "When children play by building sand 
castles, these castles are truly castles for them. If you trample them, 
the children will cry with rage and indignation. But once their play is 
at an end, what were castles are only sand."53 Adults play, but when 
adults endue things with meaning and accord them value they will not 
bear, we doubt their wisdom and, at the limit, their sanity. We may 
and must use our imagination to discover how to realize and instanti­
ate value, but we must recall at our peril, that real value is not 
imagined. White knows much and shares much about what is truly 
valuable. In The Edge of Meaning it is perhaps above all in his inter­
pretation of Vermeer, to which I called attention at the beginning, that 
he reveals his awareness that a worthwhile human life not only 
includes meaning, but also instantiates value. But the whole book 
breathes an apprehension of value, and this reader, at least, looked for 
a more elaborated recognition that our basic human eros, about which 
White reveals so much, is for the whole truth: the true that is, and the 
52. Kohler, supra note 50, at 63. 
53. Maritain, supra note 1, at 59-60. 
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true that as valuable can become the proper aim of our choosing and 
acting and living. We constitute ourselves not only by what we say, but 
also by what we choose and do. So it is, for example, that we pity or 
mock the younger Lord Brideshead when Evelyn Waugh reveals that 
his Jesuitical character occupies himself most satisfiedly in collecting 
matchboxes (and met his future wife through the connection of her 
late husband, the consummate collector of the same little treasures). 
"One's judgments of value are revealed as the door to one's fulfilment 
or to one's loss."54 
Justice, it has been said, is the institutional approximation of love, 
and it is a saying that becomes the more adequate the more equity 
emerges as justice's other part. But such j ustice - even the judge do­
ing equity's bidding, what the legislature would have done had it had 
in mind the case sub judice - professes nothing of love. White speaks 
to us of justice, he shows us how we desire, seek, and sometimes 
instantiate justice; but White, as I observed in beginning, also speaks 
to us of love. And it is here more than anywhere else, I think, that 
White lays bare his true thinking about what I have referred to as 
'value' and how we can come to know it: 
The lawyer lives on the edge of language, where meaning is made, and 
just like the poet and philosopher he must work constantly with the in­
adequacies of his inherited ways of talking, the defects of his own mind, 
the fundamental uncertainties of the world, the incomplete knowability 
of the experience of others; and he may well find his most secure ground 
of confidence and belief to lie in the activity of law itself, which stimu­
lates and works by a kind of love, less for another person than for the 
possibility of justice itself. (p. 258) 
Love for the possibility of justice itself, more than for the person 
- this is hard to get the non�Platonic mind around.55 The word 'love' 
is used (as Aristotle might say) "in many ways," and there is much in 
what White writes that helps in sorting out and clarifying the several 
Greek senses of the reality that, in English, we refer to as 'love. '  But 
when White directs our attention to what he calls his own "love" for 
the Herbert who doubts God's willingness to love such a one, I think I 
get a sense of what White means by love, and it is something that 
eluded the Greek theorists. What White bears toward Herbert is not 
erotic love, nor even the love that is, simple but wonderful, friendship, 
philia. It is the love called in the Greek of the New Testament agape. 
This is reverence of the person, a reverence that would lead to service 
54. LONERGAN, supra note 31, at 39. 
55. Another example of the Platonism of Forms seems to creep into White's work: 
[Vermeer] makes us desire perfection and security, at the same time teaching us that all that 
we can value is perpetually subject to threat. All of this may remind us of Plato and the fa­
mous myth: Vermeer stimulates in his viewer a kind of love, love for these images of women, 
which becomes not a love for any person - there is no person there at all - but of beauty 
itself, and of the vitality and volatility of human life. P. 287. 
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because of the value of the person that has been known and conse­
quently affirmed. 
That this is the love White knows is at work when law succeeds 
(by, among other aims, recognizing "the equal value of each person as 
a center of worth and meaning"56) is reinforced in what White says of 
the causes of Huck's transformation: '!The self [Huck] makes by 
speaking and thinking [as he does], insisting upon the truth of his 
experience, becomes, in the end, a self capable of giving and receiving 
love" (p. 42). Huck comes to affirm Jim's equal value as a human 
thanks to Jim's capacity "for love and truthfulness." Huck becomes 
capable of loving, of affirming Jim's equal value, through "the active 
and transforming presence of another person" (p. 44). While White 
goes on to observe . that the obtaining social structures gave Jim and 
Huck no opportunity to go on living together in the way they had 
discovered they deeply stood and deeply wanted to · stand to each 
other, withal it was the experience of person, in what we call .agape, 
that worked the personal change and simultaneously brought an in­
dictment of the social structure.57 
This exemplifies what John Noonan said in encapsulating the the­
sis of his study of the proper application of rules to the person in the 
name of the law: "Only in the response of person to person can 
Augustine's sublime fusion be achieved, in which justice is defined as 
'love serving only the one loved.' "58 It is love for the person that 
enables Huck to make a declaration, not of independence, but of 
equality. What White occludes for me with the quoted suggestion that 
the lawyer succeeds more through the love of the possibility of justice 
itself than for the person, Noonan reveals and releases. It is love of the 
person that moves us to serve as best we can - sometimes taking the 
form of j ustice, sometimes taking the form of supererogation. Love 
precedes or is a precondition of true justice, of seeing people as they 
are and treating them as what they are, what they are worth.59 
Each of the chapters of The Edge of Meaning is followed by para­
graphs or pages that contain snippets of the author's moral autobiog­
raphy. In them White shows us something of how he came to know the 
world he shares with, and commends to, his readers. In the last of 
these nine windows opened to us, White relates something concerning 
a young girl with whom he, as a part of a team of five people working 
56. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION, supra note 7, at 269. 
57. On the relationship between agape and equality (or equal regard), see GENE 
0UTKA, AGAPE: AN ETHICAL ANALYSIS 9-23, 257-312 (1972). 
58. NOONAN, supra note 13, at xii. 
59. See TIMOTHY P. JACKSON, THE PRIORITY OF LOVE: CHRISTIAN CHARITY AND 
SOCIAL JUSTICE 8-11 ,  68-69 (2003). On the foundational place of "natural love " in our 
knowing things as they are and giving them what in justice they deserve, see HANS URS VON 
BALTHASAR, THEO-LOGIC 77-78 (Adrian J. Walker trans., 2000). 
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to help children who were having trouble in school, met once a week 
for a couple years. "Here is this child beside me, I thought," having 
just heard that two of Elizabeth's relatives had been killed, 
suffering what no child should suffer. She is a fragment of God's pres­
ence on earth, as real and as important as any other, calling out for what 
I cannot provide, what no one can provide. What can I give her? Not my 
mind, or my professional expertise, or my intellectual life; only my pres­
ence, for whatever it might be worth. 
That and one other thing: it occurred to me that she might have trouble 
understanding what reading is because she had never been read to. So in 
our lessons I began reading to her from her book, then she would read, 
then I would read again. It became something we did together. (p. 288) 
In this, White was, or so it seems to me, doing justice (or what exceeds 
justice): acting not for justice's sake, but because he loved the person. 
Much thinking about law, much application of law, leaves love out. 
But once love's place in law has been recognized for what it should 
be, it is hard to disagree with Noonan's claim that "the central 
problem . . .  of the legal enterprise is the relation of love to power. "60 
The core of "the central problem," in turn, concerns whether we can, 
whether we have reason to, love one another. Agape is not an idealiz­
ing act: it looks to the other as he or she is.61 If we humans are j ust 
natural processes, meat with brain function - are we loveable? Does 
our being capable of loving one another depend on our being, as 
White said of Elizabeth, "a fragment of God's presence on earth?" 
That would make true faith a necessity. If we affirm, with Huck Finn 
and James Boyd White and others, the equal worth of humans, on 
what basis can we do this? Nonsense should be avoided,62 but its 
avoidance is by no means automatic: "Any proposition to us about 
ourselves we are in a position utterly to deny - it being always 
remembered that what the proposition is, if we grant the other is like 
ourselves, remains always a live question and that words, the words of 
the proposition, do not define themselves."63 
60. NOONAN, supra note 13, at xii. 
61. See GLENN TINDER, THE POLITICAL MEANING OF CHRISTIANITY: AN 
INTERPRETATION 42-44 (1989). 
62. On the difficulties and importance of affirming the equality of humans, see JOHN E. 
COONS & PATRICK M. BRENNAN, BY NATURE EQUAL: THE ANATOMY OF A WESTERN 
INSIGHT (1999), and Patrick McKinley Brennan, Arguing for Human Equality, 18 J.L. & 
RELIGION 99 (2002). 
63. JOSEPH VINING, THE HUMANITY OF SCIENCE: SCIENCE AND SPIRIT AFTER THE 
20TH CENJURY 168 (forthcoming 2003) (manuscript at 1 68, on file with author). Judge John 
Noonan's polemic against Judge Richard Posner's The Problematics of Moral and Legal 
Theory, 1 11 HARV. L. REV. 1637 (1998), concludes with a statement of the place of love in 
law that deeply informs my own thinking. But Noonan's otherwise flawless analysis loses 
strength by treating the issue of knowing the value of another human being as a matter of 
"seeing": 
The question who is to be included within humanity is crucial. You cannot convince an op-
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"Law can often look largely irrelevant to the self."64 Yes it can, and 
White shows us why such an appearance of law is to be resisted. Law, 
when it obtains, is (in part) meaning about value, which itself is the 
fruit of the methodical asking and answering of questions. If what goes 
forward in the name of law answers no questions of ours, it is no law 
of ours. "What, then,'' asks White, 
can be done by such creatures as we are, with such instruments as our 
languages? It is upon their own performances that [both Frost and Her­
bert] come in the end to rely: not upon creed, not upon denial, but upon 
their capacity, the human capacity to make meaning in a universe that is 
deeply uncertain. The self exists in a world it does not wholly understand, 
cannot wholly understand, and for which no language is adequate . . . .  
Something [like what these poets, and Plato, too, do], I believe is true of 
the judge and lawyer as well. The law can be seen as a collective enter­
prise the aim of which is to work out actual possibilities for thought 
about justice in the difficult conditions in which we find ourselves. (p. 
251) 
Any justifying of law quickly moves, if it is to satisfy the inquiring 
mind, from law-as-rules to legal method, establishing the terms of the 
interdependence of law and the method that makes it what it is. And 
legal method, for its part, if it can command obedience (rather than, 
say, simple compliance), issues from the method that is human intelli­
gence: experiencing, and then by questioning that experience reaching 
meaning and value first in our judgments, then in our living. As Joseph 
Vining says, "The question what the law 'is' is not so very different 
from the question what we 'are,' "65 and again in The Edge of Meaning, 
James Boyd White irradiates for our benefit something of who we are, 
and how through literature and poetry, and even law, we can become 
who we should wish to be. There is a method to it, and falling in love, 
if you can, helps. 
ponent of the humanity of another by argument - on that fundamental point Posner is 
right. But you can ask another human being to look harder, to ''see." Posner denies that you 
can, suggesting that mere sight will change nothing if your intuitions are in disagreement. 
Seeing, however, is more than a second glance. It is taking into account. intellectually, affec­
tively, and physically, all that there is in another member of our species. 
John T. Noonan, Jr., Posner's Problematics, 1 1 1  HARV. L. REV. 1768, 1774 (1998). 
64. KEVIN M. CROTTY, LAW'S INTERIOR 90 (2001). 
65. VINING, supra note 16, at 128. 
